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JANUARY 2011

The road from Mehar to Dadu, closed down due to flood-waters, starts to become passable. As trucks tried to pass on this critical transport road many veered of the road into the water – J. Brooker – SOLIDARITÉS INTERNATIONAL – 23/10/2010

Introduction

This paper is part of a series of country studies on humanitarianism and politics, which also includes Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan/Darfur, and Sri Lanka. These briefing papers are kept deliberately short in order to generate debate on the policy implications of recent crises. They will be revised and expanded later for inclusion in an edited volume on the evolving relationship between humanitarian action and politics.

Over the past five years, Pakistan has witnessed three major crises affecting up to 18 million people. The nature and scale of these crises were different. Two were disasters caused by natural hazards: the “2005 earthquake” affected 3.5 million people and the “2010 floods”...
have affected more than 20 million people. The 2008-2010 "Internally Displaced People (IDP) crisis" was triggered by an internal conflict and displaced 4.2 million people\textsuperscript{2} from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa\textsuperscript{1} (KPK) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Facing these different and significant crises in such a short period of time, humanitarian actors had to adapt rapidly and faced dilemmas that were new to them in the context of Pakistan.

This paper examines the impact of the three above-mentioned crises\textsuperscript{4} on the evolution of the humanitarian system and its ability to respond to emergencies in Pakistan since 2005. It follows a chronological order, looking first at the legacy of the 2005 earthquake response on the humanitarian system, and second at the influence it had on its ability to respond to the 2008–2010 IDP crisis, and finally it explores the challenges humanitarians had to face at the onset of the flood crisis.

**Methodology**
The study relies on interviews and direct observations done in Islamabad, Peshawar (KPK), and Sukkur (Sindh) between August 16 and September 3, 2010. Thirty-three interviews were held, eight with United Nations (UN) agencies, four with donors, five with government (federal and provincial), ten with International NGOs, three with local organizations (including the Pakistani Red Crescent Society), one with an international freelance journalist, one with a military affiliated structure, and one with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Six cluster meetings and one daily National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) meeting were attended. Three camps for flood-affected people were visited in Sukkur, where informal discussions with flood-affected people took place. The context of the research was systematically explained to the interviewees. Interviews were semi-structured with a set of questions prepared specifically for each set of interviewees.
1. The 2005 Earthquake and the Benefits of Working Closely with the Military

A Very Young Emergency Response Capacity
Until 2005, organized large-scale humanitarian action in Pakistan was limited to Afghan refugees, who arrived en masse in the 1980s in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan. UN agencies, international NGOs, and the Red Cross/Crescent Movement were based in Peshawar and Quetta and have been assisting Afghans in refugee camps along the border with Afghanistan ever since. Most Pakistani NGOs were created in the 1980s and the 1990s and were development organizations working at grass-roots level, mainly on structural, social, economic, and health issues. This is the context in which the 2005 earthquake occurred and, regardless of their previous expertise, organizations working in Pakistan mobilized to assist those affected. Traditional international relief organizations stepped in alongside local development organizations, benefiting from their knowledge of local networks and culture. The Pakistani civil society itself played a major role in the response to the extent that it was considered to be "the largest philanthropic response by Pakistanis that the country [had] ever experienced."

A Successful Military-led Response
The government of Pakistan's institutions, except for the military, were ill-prepared, and the Pakistani army rapidly took the lead in the response, creating what was qualified as one of the best examples of international civil-military cooperation. A serving military officer, Major General Farooq Ahmad, was appointed as the head of the Federal Relief Commission (FRC) in charge of the coordination of the emergency response. Three years later, two senior officials involved in the response—one Pakistani and one UN—summarized the ingredients of what they called “non-interfering coordination,” which included the following key principles:

1. Share an open and honest assessment of needs with the NGO and humanitarian world, including the United Nations.
2. Allow humanitarian actors to choose what operations they will undertake, rather than dictate activities.
3. Ask NGOs to inform central commanders of the choices made.
4. Central commanders can then identify unmet gaps in humanitarian delivery, which can then be back-filled with the Army and other government agencies.

The article shows how military and humanitarian actors were complementary:

"The military has assets, mobility, means, organisation and wherewithal, and can provide national, district and local coordination infrastructure for NGOs, civil society and international support to 'plug in to.' Most importantly, they can work in distant areas, hard-to-reach and perhaps 'insecure' regions."

And theoretically humanitarian actors have the “soft” know-how on protection of vulnerable groups such as children under five or women and on ensuring equity among different communities or recipient groups.
An Early Pilot of the UN Humanitarian Reform and the Cluster System
In parallel, the UN decided to pilot the newly-adopted humanitarian reform and its cluster system. Far from clashing with military initiatives, some have even argued that

“Ironically, the military found it easier to adapt to the new Cluster mechanism than did the humanitarian world.”

The IASC Real Time Evaluation conducted in February 2006 recommended improvements to the cluster approach, especially in terms of clarifying objectives and responsibilities, but overall assessed the clusters as having “successfully provided a single and recognizable framework for coordination, collaboration, decision-making and practical solutions in a chaotic operational environment.”13 UNDP funds were used to set up the Federal Relief Commission (FRC), which decided to use the clusters platform for the overall coordination of national relief efforts. As a result, Pakistan is one of the rare cases where national and international coordination set-ups for emergency response coincided.

Legacy for Humanitarian Action in Pakistan
Among other points, it is interesting to underline two major legacies of the earthquake response for humanitarian action in Pakistan. One touches on Pakistani infrastructures and the other on the dynamics between humanitarian actors and the Pakistani military.

In the aftermath of the earthquake, the Pakistani government created institutions responsible for disaster preparedness and response at national, provincial, and local levels. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) was defined as responsible for policy-making and coordination at the national level. At the provincial level, Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) were “mandated to effectively set up a system to look after disasters and calamities whether natural, man-induced, or accidents.”14 PDMAs were to become the backbone of emergency responses at the provincial level.

The earthquake response was considered one of the best ever implemented in the context of a natural hazard of such a scale. Debating whether it was appropriate to cooperate so closely with the Pakistani armed forces was not considered a priority and eventually humanitarian actors accepted it pragmatically as the most effective solution to urgent needs in rescuing people, setting up extensive camps, and providing the camps with basic medical, water, sanitation, and food assistance. The 2005 earthquake response could be considered an example of the universality of humanitarian action, which overrode terrorism and counter-terrorism concerns. The idea that Pakistan was one of the main staging areas of the “Global War On Terror” (GWOT) and that there was a risk of tensions between political, security, and humanitarian agendas had simply been set aside, and the successful collaboration between humanitarians and the military built a solid level of trust between the humanitarian community and the military.15


Within two years of the disaster, the majority of international NGOs that had come to Pakistan for the earthquake response had left the country as a natural consequence of the reduction of funds available or in some cases having decided that their mandate no longer applied to remaining needs. Clusters were put on hold, still existing but mostly inactive. NGOs that remained staffed their teams with more development-experienced people and adopted more development-like set-ups for covering structural needs with long-term approaches.

In the meantime, as the Pakistani government had considered the cluster experience to be a success, when the possibility of a One UN approach emerged in 2007, they volunteered. The idea behind the One UN is to reach “more coherent programmes, reduced transaction costs for governments, and lower overhead costs for the UN system,”16 based on four principles: one leader, one budget, one program, and one office. This meant the incorporation of the humanitarian efforts within the GoP’s political agenda. Even though Pakistani military operations against militants in South Waziristan had started as early as 2004, Pakistan was selected, along with Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Vietnam to pilot the “delivering as one” approach. This positioned Pakistan as a peaceful developing country, whose state institutions the international community should support rather than preparing for a political crisis. As a result, when the conflict intensified in 2008–2009, the humanitarian community was not well prepared to react swiftly and appropriately—and in an impartial manner.

3. 2008–2010: Deepening Conflict and Humanitarian Dilemmas

What has commonly been called, from 2009 onwards, “the IDP crisis” showed that humanitarian action that does not uphold principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence can jeopardize the primary task of saving lives and alleviating suffering, especially for those who are hard to reach.

Although the Pakistani army operations against militants in South Waziristan had started as early as 2004, and triggered significant displacement, the humanitarian community mostly did not investigate needs in KPK and the FATA until 2008. The emerging conflict was not attracting much international media attention and organizations working in Pakistan, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),17 considered those areas non-accessible.

In 2008, after military operations in FATA had displaced more than 500,000 people in the region, the humanitarian community started to intervene. The ICRC, until then mostly working for Afghan refugees, extended its programming to protection and assistance to Pakistani non-combatants affected by the conflict. It opened offices...
in Karachi, Lahore, Mingora (Swat), and in the FATA. Their budget grew from approximately $20 million in 2008 to $100 million in 2009 and $130 million in 2010 (before the floods); the number of their employees grew from 200 in 2008 to 1,300 in 2010. Many NGOs also scaled up their presence.

Stabilization of Swat
When the Pakistani military operations intensified and especially when the Swat operation started in April 2009, the humanitarian machine mobilized again. It was called in by the GoP in what appears to have been an attempt to find greater coherence between its different spheres of intervention, de facto embedding humanitarian action in the GoP’s stabilization strategy. The counter-insurgency operations led by the Pakistani army in the Malakand division in April had triggered more than 2.8 million IDPs, and in July 2009 the Pakistani military initiated a mass return of the displaced. By mid-August, the government announced that 1.6 million IDPs were back in their areas of origin. This was a signal sent to the people of Pakistan that a successful security operation was underway. In turn, the GoP expected aid actors to come and help people reconstruct their lives.

Throughout the crisis, the government of Pakistan called for international assistance for the IDPs and then for the returnees. Once again, the response was mostly coordinated by the Pakistani military, and by collaborating with the Pakistani military most actors consciously or unconsciously accepted the risk that relief would not be delivered on the basis of need. Many international actors relied on local NGOs to implement their programs. Those who had experienced the 2005 earthquake applied spontaneously the same “hand-in-hand with the military” approach, to the extent that beneficiary lists were sometimes shared with or even provided by the military.

In fact, when the Swat valley IDP crisis started, very few people in the aid community had practical experience of the challenges of preserving principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality when it came to meeting the actual needs of the affected population in a conflict environment. One of the first critical assessments on the topic was published in September 2009 by the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute, which spoke about “a clash of principles,” arguing that “humanitarians [had] not spoken out against the conduct of hostilities and the politicisation of the emergency response” and “that aid agencies [were] faced with the dilemma of engaging with and supporting government efforts to promote stability or maintaining a principled approach.”

Macro Legal Access
The issue of access lies at the center of the dilemma humanitarians had to face. The GoP has strict control on access to KPK and FATA in general. International NGOs wanting to implement programs in Pakistan have to submit an application to the Economic Affairs Department (EAD) of the Ministry for Finance and Economic Affairs for each project and be granted a “No Objection Certificate” (NOC). This process officially takes seven days, but in practice can...
take up to several months and can be “used to control access to pressure NGOs to accept instructions about providing assistance to particular beneficiaries.”20 For example, access to areas bordering South Waziristan (Dera Ismael Khan and Tank) was denied to humanitarian actors for months at a period when hundreds of thousands of people were being displaced. When access to Dera Ismael Khan and Tank was eventually permitted, it was restricted to local personnel, thus preventing most organizations from activating traditional operational relief mechanisms. Humanitarian actors developed ad hoc strategies of sub-contracting their response or sending their key local staff to implement it, in order to reach in a timely manner the 428,000 people who had fled South Waziristan. However, adjusting those strategies in an emergency and in areas agencies were not familiar with was a challenge to principled approaches. Even when they were aware of principles and their rationale, Pakistani personnel were under very high pressure from the Pakistani military to operate under their umbrella.

In May 2009, the GoP military established a headquarter structure designated as Special Support Group (SSG) for IDPs and assigned it the responsibility for logistics, health, administration, and to assist in registration.21 According to a member of the SSG, its role was to mediate between the military and humanitarian actors. However, even though the SSG theoretically reports to the PDMA, it is practically responsible for security clearances to access areas in KPK/FATA, which ultimately gives it the power to refuse access. As one observer noted,

“The Pakistani armed forces not only decide where, when and how to conduct anti-Taliban operations, but also—primarily through the civil–military Special Support Group—largely dictate the terms of the humanitarian response.”

Local Political Access
Implementing principles has never been an easy task and the conflict in Pakistan illustrates how reaching out to militants and obtaining local acceptance has been and still is a major challenge. Pashtuns living in the tribal areas have long been hostile to contacts with the Western world and the evolution of international politics relying on the GWOT discourse has further eroded their perception of Westerners or of Pakistanis supporting the GoP. Moreover, senior officials like the UN Special Envoy for Assistance making public statements of support to the Pakistani military effort to eradicate terrorism in the FATA, and associating humanitarian actors with a "post-crisis peace-building"23 agenda have not done any good to the image of humanitarian actors in the region. Security is a growing concern among humanitarian actors and has led them to step up protective measures, to the extent of sending negative signals to local populations in some instances. The general perception among aid workers is that threats are diverse and coming from different groups whose dynamics are very difficult to grasp. Without being the primary targets, humanitarians were directly targeted several times since 2008.24 As a result, many agencies developed protective and deterrent measures. This evolution can be observed in Islamabad as well as in Peshawar, where massive prison-like buildings have mushroomed, separating expatriates from what one analyst describes as the “undocumented surplus-life” existing outside these walls.25 Such “fortified aid compounds”26 designed to keep the local world out are intimidating and symbolic of the recent militarization of security management in the aid sector that is counterproductive when it comes to working on local acceptance and the building of trust as a basis for access to vulnerable populations.

The general perception of external27 humanitarian actors in the FATA or in KPK was that if at best they were not pursuing intelligence for the Pakistani government, humanitarians at least conveyed values considered in KPK and FATA as clashing with traditional systems and values. Local political access was hence close to nil, except to a certain extent for the ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in some areas, as described later in this paper.

The Impossible Situation of the UN
The very existence of a UN Special Envoy for Assistance in Pakistan, in addition to a Resident Coordinator and a Humanitarian Coordinator, illustrates the ambiguity the UN apparatus is embedded in and the leadership challenges it faces. On the one hand, UN agencies belong to the One UN and are therefore expected to support Pakistani institutions. On the other, the UN humanitarian reform gave OCHA and the humanitarian country team (HCT) the responsibility to coordinate the response and in doing so to uphold principles of neutrality and impartiality. UN officials interviewed have described this as a “clash between the two reforms.”

Traditionally close to the GoP, operational UN agencies were seen as being too close. As a result, at the onset of the conflict and until the Swat displacement, the UN was blamed for not wanting to “confront the government and acknowledge the scale of the problem;”28 that is, to uphold the humanitarian imperative for IDPs from FATA/KPK and risk jeopardizing their good relationship with Pakistani authorities. Similar criticisms about the UN’s behavior at a later stage of the response were formulated as follows:

“instead of advocating for a more needs-based registration criteria or overcoming exclusion errors by supplementing government beneficiary lists with agencies’ own lists of vulnerable individuals (as was done, for example, by the ICRC and several NGOs), most members of the HCT simply continued to base their response on what they knew to be flawed registration lists.”

A view supported by several of the people interviewed in the course of this research is that, in 2008–2009, the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and the WFP, by working closely with the GoP, which was a party to the conflict, largely contributed to making negotiations with the GoP very difficult for other humanitarian actors willing to operate more independently, for instance without armed escorts or with expatriate staff on the ground. The power of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) to balance this out was generally rated as very low, be it for personality
or structural reasons: the HC was sometimes blamed for not being strong enough in defending principles in HCT meetings and described as having his hands tied in front of the heads of agencies managing the largest humanitarian UN budgets in the country.

Reported tensions within the HCT reflect the lack of unity and the struggle to make incompatible responsibilities coexist. Several aid workers referred positively to the role of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as the main agency which had invested in issues of access, protection, and impartiality of assistance, through negotiations with authorities at the national and provincial level. For example, in February 2010, OCHA managed to push the issue of the sharing of beneficiary lists onto the agenda of the “Policy and Strategy Committee” and to have the committee agree “that nominal lists of beneficiaries (i.e., beneficiary names) [would] not be shared with the civil or military authorities.” In order to try and frame the civil military coordination in Pakistan, OCHA drafted Guidelines and, while waiting for the Pakistani military to sign them, circulated the document in March 2010 within the humanitarian community. They also launched a pilot vulnerability assessment of people affected by the Swat displacement. This eventually became a multi-agency (NGOs as well as UN agencies) effort to refine the targeting of beneficiaries by the humanitarian agencies after the Swat crisis. The vulnerability assessment was a successful initiative and, at the time interviews were conducted, it was to be replicated in all other districts hosting people affected by the conflict.

The issue of access was probably where attempts were the less successful: OCHA managed to obtain authorizations to send expatriates, under armed escort, to monitor assistance in Dera Ismael Khan and Tank. Unfortunately, their convoy was stopped at the border of the district, and the mission aborted.

In conclusion, UN humanitarian agencies were torn between two internal reforms. Overall, this tension has negatively impacted on their ability to fulfill their humanitarian mandate to the extent that some of the large humanitarian agencies have reportedly contributed to making negotiations of access with Pakistani authorities very difficult. In this context, OCHA has however managed to create opportunities for upholding humanitarian principles on a certain number of issues and mainly with Pakistani authorities. For security and political issues, it was impossible for OCHA to negotiate access with militant groups, thus adding to the perceptions that the UN was one-sided.

**MSF and the ICRC Exceptions**

MSF and the ICRC have shown an explicit will not to align themselves with the UN and have carefully avoided association with the latter. Whilst having different mission statements and mandates, both MSF and ICRC shared a similar approach in order to access politically sensitive areas in Pakistan, i.e., districts of KPK and FATA and Balochistan. They explicitly and consciously tried to prove their independence and neutrality in order to provide protection and assistance in an impartial way, that is, on the basis of need. This could be defined as a “principled approach,” if there was a precise protocol. However, there is not one single way of reaching affected people in an impartial way, and both organizations have been doing it in their own ways, building upon their strong organizational identities.

The ICRC is mandated by states and funded by them on the basis of a total independence of the use of these funds in the framework of their mandate. The confidence the ICRC has built over the years with its own donors in order to operate freely is constantly challenged and maintained thanks to a proven record and the recognized quality of their work.

Similarly, MSF insists on its financial independence and hence in Pakistan does not accept funds from any government donor. It uses this as one of its arguments to prove the consistency of its acts with its intentions when negotiating access in the field: not being financed by any state and therefore minimizing the perception that MSF is “instrumentalized” is a necessary condition to prove its independence.

In order to be useful, principles need to translate into concrete actions, and this starts with a clear understanding of principles by agency field staff (national and international). MSF for instance has a strong policy of briefing its staff on its mission statement and on principles of humanitarian action, which they implement even in the context of an emergency response. Another tool MSF uses is communication. MSF has developed a communication strategy specifically for Afghanistan and Pakistan, which relies on the message that MSF is an independent medical humanitarian association—purposely avoiding the “NGO” acronym. According to the organization, the reason for not using the term NGO is to avoid confusion with other NGOs that have different mission statements, and to attempt to shape its perception independently from the rest of the humanitarian community. In a similar way, the ICRC has differentiated itself by, among other things, using a high profile strategy in terms of visibility on the ground. In 2009, the ICRC was one of the very few organizations that had stickers and flags on its vehicles.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that both organizations would argue this approach is not sufficient to build a trustful relationship with a party to a conflict. A strong will and the capability to understand, discuss, and negotiate with parties to a conflict is a crucial element in order to gain access to sensitive areas and operate impartially. Negotiation entails the search for common interests and acceptable compromises. One characteristic of this kind of approach is that it is time- and resource-consuming and therefore not cost-effective compared to programs embedded in the stabilization strategy of the GoP, for which the local acceptance is in line with and supported by national politics.

For example, it took MSF more than six months to negotiate access locally to work in a hospital in Hangu, after it had received the provincial authorities’ green light. MSF requested that the hospital be weapons-free. Long negotiations resulted in a compromise whereby local authorities requested that MSF set up strict security measures at the entrance of the hospital (including high walls, sand bags) to ensure people’s safety. For the MSF team, it was urgent to...
start treating patients, but more important in the long term to secure a weapons-free space; therefore the decision was made to invest time and resources to secure a real “operational space,” translating into a better access to patients, better treatments, and greater trust from the local people.

Neither MSF nor ICRC would claim they have an exclusive recipe for access. A few other organizations have tried to use such principles as a tool for access, but often with a less systematic approach and, sometimes, greater gaps between their organizational rhetoric and institutional decisions.

4. The Humanitarian Crisis in Pakistan after the 2010 Floods, a Natural Hazard or a Complex Emergency?

The 2010 floods were a “giant hit” on the Pakistani population with whom the Western public did not show a great deal of solidarity. The Pakistani philanthropic agencies, together with the military, proved once again their responsiveness. Nevertheless, the international humanitarian response was rated as slow, half-hearted, and mainly backed up by a stabilization rationale.

An “Image Deficit”

The UN launched an appeal on August 11. By mid-August, the appeal was 30% funded and by November 29th, after revision, the floods emergency response plan was only 49% funded. International public opinion was not moved:

One week after launching its appeal for the Haiti earthquake in January, the Humanitarian Coalition in Canada had raised $3.5 million. Now, a week after a similar campaign for the devastating floods in Pakistan, the coalition has received only $200,000 in public donations.

After the Haiti earthquake, about 3.1 million Americans using mobile phones donated $10 each to the Red Cross, raising about $31 million. A similar campaign to raise contributions for Pakistan produced only about $10,000. The amount of funding donated per person affected by the 2004 tsunami was $1249.80, and for the 2010 Haiti earthquake, $1087.33. Even for the Pakistan earthquake of 2005, funding per affected person was $388.33. Thus far, [19 August] for those affected by the 2010 floods, it is $16.36 per person.

Within the first month of the catastrophe, the media highlighted the tepid solidarity with which Western public opinion reacted to the distress of millions of Pakistanis. Many explanations were offered. From a pure communication perspective, the floods happened at the wrong time; there was “public opinion fatigue” after a tremendous mobilization for victims of the January earthquake in Haiti. The “West” was on holiday, less inclined to pay attention to “bad news.” Another explanation was that WikiLeaks had recently released documents illustrating the ambiguous role of Pakistan in the Afghan war. Finally, Pakistan was the wrong country: a Muslim country famous for its high corruption rate and as a nuclear power was not perceived as needing charity. And floods were the wrong disaster: they happened very progressively, therefore less spectacularly than an earthquake or a tsunami; and whilst 217,300 people died in the Haitian earthquake, the floods took “only” 1,985 lives.

Whatever the reasons, it is certainly true that the Western international reaction was far less important than for the 2009 Haiti earthquake or 2004 tsunami. However, it cannot be stated that this was the only cause of all the troubles concerning the flood response.

In October 2010, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank assessed Pakistan flood damage at $9.7 billion.
A Slow International Response

Whereas assistance in northern districts of Pakistan was deployed in a responsive manner,\textsuperscript{44} most of the international humanitarian agencies struggled to bring their relief systems up to speed in Punjab, Sindh, and Balochistan. In the first weeks following the beginning of the floods, humanitarian organizations redirected their KPK/FATA programs towards an emergency response to people affected by the floods. A strong military presence in KPK also contributed to a rapid emergency response. Coordination between Pakistani civilian and military authorities and the humanitarian system was facilitated through an up-and-running cluster system in Peshawar headed by UN agencies and co-chaired by PDMA agents.

Central to the response was the issue of access. Millions of people were isolated on strips of land, unable to move to assistance points and very difficult to reach. The humanitarian response was especially slow in Sindh, Punjab, and Balochistan for two main reasons: access to certain areas was logistically impossible and most humanitarian organizations had no presence in Punjab and Sindh before the floods. In mid-August, the GoP issued an NOC waiver for certain parts of KPK to facilitate access and speed up the international response; however, the most sensitive districts of FATA and KPK remained practically no-go areas for security reasons. Access for expatriates to Dera Ismael Khan and Tank continued to be blocked while the response needed to be swiftly scaled up and some INGOs emergency surge protocols required the presence of expatriates. Similarly, the GoP did not authorize the United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) to deploy helicopters in KPK/FATA, where the use of Pakistani aircraft by humanitarians was the most problematic in terms of the perceptions of the local population.

In terms of institutional funding for international humanitarian organizations, the bulk of emergency funds started to be available between the middle and end of August, i.e., almost a month after the start of the floods.

For the first time in Pakistan, the UN used the Emergency Response Fund (ERF) mechanism. The ERF was designed to ensure accessibility to funds within 24 to 72 hours.\textsuperscript{45} However, when it was activated, it was overwhelmed by 72 projects\textsuperscript{46} and failed to respond swiftly. By August 17, 32 proposals had been returned to the organizations with additional requests (mainly missing documents). Only eight proposals were approved, and two rejected: NGOs had not been precise enough in submitting their applications, OCHA did not have enough personnel to process the proposals, and the validation process described in the ERF guidelines seemed to...
involve too many hierarchical layers. During a NDMA meeting, General Nadeem, head of the NDMA, kindly but firmly asked OCHA to simplify the bureaucracy and try and have 25% of the proposals approved within the next 72 hours.

Criticism also focused on the types of costs covered by the ERF. They did not cover expatriate costs at a time when all INGOs were trying to scale up and therefore hire more personnel (including more expatriates with an expertise in rapid responses). While classic emergency funding schemes cover sometimes up to 40% of support costs (logistics, administrative, and staff costs), in addition to 7% of the total budget allocated to head office costs, the ERF covered a maximum of 7% including all the above mentioned, and excluding expatriate costs.

Additionally, the whole humanitarian system was stretched in terms of human resources. Organizations had to second people from other countries for short periods of time, increasing the turnover rate, entailing discontinuity in the management of programs and loss of knowledge in the history of interventions. The cluster system expanded to new areas: UN humanitarian "hubs" were set up in Sindh and Punjab. At the beginning of September, at the time of our visit, the whole machine was being built but was not yet up and running. The Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF), which a group of INGOs had formed in 2005 in order to strengthen INGO coordination, networking, and advocacy within Pakistan surely helped NGOs networking in Islamabad, and issued press statements on the low level of funding compared to actual needs since 2009. However, it did not exploit its potential for serving as a humanitarian advocacy platform similar to the ACBAR (Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief) model in Afghanistan. In August, it was decided to create a dedicated PHF Manager position, as well as a structure called PAKSAFE, hosted by the PHF and dedicated to Security Information Management similar to ANSO (Afghanistan NGO Safety Office). These steps show how the system attempted to adjust and become more sophisticated in the face of successive crises and an increasingly complex environment.

**“Army Zindabad!” and the Underlying Stabilization Strategy**

Even though the Pakistani government has been extensively blamed for being too slow in responding to the catastrophe, it is worth noting that its military institutions were at the fore of the response: 60,000 army troops were employed in Rescue and Relief Operations, and as of August 27, they had rescued 800,000 people and set up over 100 Army Relief Camps across the country. As one of the main actors on the ground in the South, the Pakistani military took part in UN coordination platforms. NATO and other international military forces provided resources as well as logistics support to the Pakistani government.

Similarly to the 2005 earthquake response, local organizations related to Islamist groups and political parties proved their reactivity and proximity to local communities. Although there should not be anything surprising about Islamic organizations working at the grassroots level in a Muslim country, once again, this phenomenon raised concerns in the media as to whether actions of such groups would spread support for Islamist militants. There is so far no solid proof for such an argument.

Still, this rationale was used on many occasions to sensitize the Western public to the importance of donating to Pakistan:

> “Unless we act decisively, large parts of flood-stricken Pakistan will be taken over by the Taliban,”

writes Ahmed Rashid in the *Telegraph*. This line of argument became so pervasive that, even when trying to advocate for the “depoliticization” of humanitarian aid, the director of Church World Services used the same underlying argument of stabilization strategies:

> “If the international community does not come up with support at this time of need, the flood-survivors’ children will go in droves to the madrassas because they have food there. If you don’t send aid to where the need is, people will be more vulnerable to the militant organisations that believe in violence. They have nothing left, so we will be pushing them into the arms of these militant groups whose humanitarian wings are providing help.”

As mentioned earlier in this paper, the intention to stabilize has been an underlying rationale for the overall international aid strategy in Pakistan at least since 2008. The floods have not escaped that logic and along these lines Richard C. Holbrooke, the US administration’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, said:

> “If we do the right thing, it will be good not only for the people whose lives we save but for the U.S. image in Pakistan… The people of Pakistan will see that when the crisis hits, it’s not the Chinese. It’s not the Iranians. It’s not other countries. It’s not the E.U. It’s the U.S. that always leads.”

Certainly this logic attracted substantial resources for the response, and the US was the swiftest to react after the start of the floods and eventually contributed approximately $630 million. They are by far the largest donor, with 33% of the total of donations recorded by the UN Financial Tracking Service. However, it is not so clear whether the Islamist Straw Man has helped to mobilize public opinion or just further reinforced prejudices against Pakistanis.

**Humanitarian Dilemmas**

Never before 2008 had the US invested so much in foreign assistance in Pakistan during a civilian rule. For the first time, this was intended not to buy Pakistan’s support for US foreign policy but “to help stabilize Pakistan itself.” With such a backdrop, can one consider the 2010 massive floods in isolation as a solely natural humanitarian crisis?

As more than 74% of the funds allocated for the floods come from countries involved in the war in Afghanistan, there is a high level...
of dependency among international humanitarian actors on institutional donors directly or indirectly involved in conflict and a regional stabilization strategy.

The principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) “support humanitarian action that is explicitly neutral and impartial in its intent;” however, it is not so much the intent as the perception of neutrality that is central to impartial humanitarian action. For example, when donor governments are perceived as aligned with one party to the conflict, donors can put the neutrality (and the security) of their delivery partners at risk when they insist on displaying logos on the assets of programs they fund. If donors encourage the NGOs they fund to publicize the origins of the funds rather than the life-saving activities they implement, this adds to the perception of the alignment of aid with political agendas.

The scale of the floods certainly put an enormous amount of pressure on actors delivering aid. One had to be pragmatic and as many people as possible had to be reached. Facing the volume of needs and the complexity of the political background, organizations had to make choices. Concrete questions arose: Is it possible to use military assets and preserve perceptions that humanitarian aid does not take sides? In the age of the “citizen reporter,” information on what agencies do and on the origins of their funds travels fast and is accessible to many who would not have had access to the inner workings of aid agencies in the past. Is it morally acceptable to refuse to use military assets if this means not reaching millions of people?

Humanitarian actors used Pakistani military assets at the onset of the emergency invoking the “last resort” principle of the guidelines on the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief. At least until September 2010, the World Food Programme (WFP) used military assets to deliver food in inaccessible areas of Punjab and Sindh. The issue was discussed in a Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) meeting and WFP obtained an exceptional validation from the HC on the grounds of “last resort” until United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) would be able to take over.

The government of Pakistan called for NATO to support it with an air-bridge to transport goods from donating countries. It seems there was a vivid internal debate among UN agencies on whether to use the NATO air-bridge, considering the role of NATO in the Afghan conflict and the political regional implications. The Humanitarian Country Team finally ruled out the option of using the NATO air-bridge, on the basis that this was not a last resort situation as there were civilian alternatives available.

ICRC and MSF felt really strongly that they should not use any military asset to deliver assistance, nor any kind of labelling associating them with donor states or the United Nations, to the point they would refuse to be mentioned in the UN public reporting such as the “Who Does What Where” report, in order to preserve a sense of control over their image.

5. Conclusions

The humanitarian system as we know it today in Pakistan was born with the 2005 earthquake response. This humanitarian intervention was an example of a successful joint humanitarian-military intervention, which set the conditions for the response to the subsequent major crises, starting in 2008. The displacement crisis in KPK/FATA was the consequence of a counter-insurgency strategy. The fact that the humanitarian system had difficulties emancipating itself from the previous response set-up triggered severe breaches of principles of humanitarian action, and, as a consequence, some conflict-affected people were deprived of basic assistance. When the floods started to strike Pakistan in July 2010, the system had not yet adjusted according to recent lessons learnt and had to face a double-faced crisis of an unprecedented scale. In this context, the following set of conclusions on the humanitarian architecture and on operational approaches are drawn from this analysis.

On the humanitarian architecture:

a. The latest Real-Time Evaluation of the IDP crisis response commissioned by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee mentioned that

“The reason why this paper does not engage more with strengths and weaknesses of clusters in the last two crises is that these issues have already been covered by other reports. Additionally, as long as the different UN agencies will not report to the Humanitarian Coordinator but essentially to their own headquarters, any recommendation on improving the UN humanitarian leadership and all that follows will fall on deaf ears. While personalities may well be important, the issue is essentially structural: unless there is a solid commitment to principles from the headquarters of UN agencies and from donors—including an HC empowered to ensure that humanitarian action is protected as much as possible from subordination to political and/or development agendas—substantive change will remain elusive.”

b. In reference to the funds channelled by the cluster system, it is also worth repeating that the global inter-cluster mission led in July 2009 underlined that

“It is preferable that money does not pass through lead agencies as current fund disbursement mechanisms have proven to be slow in Pakistan. In addition, disbursement of project funding through [Cluster Lead Agency] has exacerbated tensions among partners and presents an avoidable conflict-of-interest dilemma.”
c. As explained, there has been a space for OCHA to advocate vis-à-vis civilian and military Pakistani authorities about the respect for principles of humanitarian action. This effort should be maintained without trying to publicly associate humanitarian NGOs with UN agencies in order for each type of organization to be able to control its own image.

On operational approaches:

a. “To promote respect for humanitarian principles, agencies need to be sure of their own principles and to ensure that they live by them,” as noted in an HPG report in 2000. This issue is not new, but Pakistan provides an exacerbated set of examples to illustrate the gap between the rhetoric of principles and their practical implementation. The rhetoric is doing more harm than good, as it is discrediting principles as a genuine negotiation tool for access. Humanitarian actors should refrain from communicating about principles without having a solid intention and plan for using and respecting them in practice.

b. The MSF and ICRC experiences in Pakistan show that principles should not be opposed to pragmatism. In emergencies, organizations sometimes claim pragmatism to justify their operational choices. This pragmatism is mostly confused with opportunism. It is considered pragmatic to take any donors’ money and to use military assets, but it is not considered pragmatic to build a relationship of trust with people living in politically-sensitive areas or to refuse to participate in the stabilization strategy of one party to the conflict. Creating opportunities is as important as being able to seize them. Humanitarian organizations should reassert the idea that principles are used as a practical tool for negotiating access to affected populations and providing protection and assistance according to needs only. Having said this, principles should not be flagged as the magic recipe that will necessarily open access: the point here is that they are a useful base for starting negotiation with warring parties, not that they are sufficient guarantee of success.

c. As mentioned in the report concerning neutrality, intentions do not matter as much as how they are perceived. Labels, operational set-ups, project outcomes, and communication of humanitarian agencies all contribute to their general image and how the population they assist perceives them. Several organizations admitted they did not exactly know how their beneficiaries perceived them. However, decisions like using low profile strategies or openly communicating on behalf of foreign donors are based on assumptions of people’s perceptions, which are not necessarily informed by rigorous analyses. Studies on perceptions should be conducted more frequently by organizations to update and adjust their approaches according to assessed opinions.

Footnotes

1. The author wishes to thank all interviewees for having taken some of their precious time during the floods response to answer questions and discuss humanitarian issues, Aamir Anjum for facilitating all aspects of the visit in Pakistan and providing his insight on issues discussed in this study, the MSF team for facilitating the visit to Peshawar, Nicki and Thomas for their warm welcome in Islamabad, SOLIDARITÉS INTERNATIONAL for facilitating administrative issues, Oliver Milne and Fabrice Weissman for their precious comments, and Antonio Donini without whom this paper would simply not exist.

2. Formerly called North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).

4. The time frame considered starts in 2005, and the crises considered are those that have affected more than two million people, thus excluding the flash floods triggered by the 2007 cyclone Yemyin, the 2008 Balochistan earthquake, the 2009 Karachi floods, and the 2010 Hunza Lake landslide. The 2008 food crisis that affected Pakistan as well as many other countries has not been included because of its limited impact on humanitarian action in Pakistan.

5. A few of the largest ones being Lasoona (http://www.lasoona.org/), Spado (http://www.spado.org.pk/about.htm#Goal), Poda (http://www.poda.org.pk/About%20Us.html), and RSPN (http://www.rspn.org/about_us/introduction.html).

6. The Edhi Foundation appears to be somewhat atypical in its expertise on emergency assistance. Founded in 1951, it provides medical aid, family planning, and emergency assistance through over 300 centers across the country, in big cities, small towns, and remote rural areas.


8. It included US, British, NATO, and Australian military forces working together under Pakistani leadership.


10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
15. It is worth noting that even if there have been widespread reports of militant-related organizations being active in the aftermath of the earthquake, a recent study by Tahir Andrab and Jishnu Das showed that “the presence of militant organizations at the village level was extremely limited even in villages close to the fault-line—of all organizations, these had the lowest coverage and even at their highest point right next to the fault-line, not more than 10 percent of households report receiving assistance from such an organization.” Tahir Andrab and Jishnu Das, “In Aid We Trust: Hearts and Minds and the Pakistan Earthquake of 2005” (Policy Research Working Paper, The World Bank, October 2010), http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?entityID=000158349_20101005131809&menuPK=64216926&pagePK=64165259&piPK=64165421&theSitePK=469372.
17. Author’s interview with the head of the ICRC delegation in Pakistan, August 24, 2010.
18. Ibid.
24. On October 5, 2009, the WFP office in Islamabad was attacked by a suicide bomber, killing five people. On February 18, 2010, four aid workers working for Mercy Corps were kidnapped 200 km north of Quetta. One was killed and the three others were released on July 15, 2010. On March 10, 2010, seven people working for World Vision were killed in their office in Mansehra district.
26. Ibid.
27. This not only refers to international actors. Any Pakistani NGO, unless very locally rooted, would be perceived as external as well and fall into an associated category of unwanted organization.
30. Ibid., 12.
31. The policy and strategy committee is chaired by the Chief Secretary of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or the Director General of PaRRSA/ PDMA, co-chaired by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and attended by representatives of the Special Support Group, PDMA/ PaRRSA, FDMA, and the humanitarian community (WFP, UNHCR, ICRC, OCHA, and Pakistan Humanitarian Forum).
33. In September 2010, the military still had not signed them.
35. Even when MSF opened a base in Sukkur, Sindh to respond to the flood-affected people, it dedicated a day of briefing for any new recruited staff on MSF mission statement, practices, and principles.
36. Ross Mountain, “Looking Back, Moving Forward, Applying the Lessons Learnt from the Haiti Earthquake Response,” ODI event, October 26, 2010, http://itunes.apple.com/podcast/odi-events/id374907483. Speaking of the Haiti as well as the Pakistan earthquake disasters, Ross Mountain stated that “it is and it has been indisputably beyond the effective equipment of the international community to deal with.”


38. As a comparison, more than two million people were affected by the earthquake that hit Haiti on January 12, 2010.


44. The fact that there were more casualties in the North can be attributed to other factors, such as the fact that the floods started in the North and people had less time to leave or the fact that some had already recently been affected by displacement.

45. “Pakistan Emergency Response Fund Revised Guidelines.”

46. General Coordination Meeting, Islamabad, August 17, 2010.

47. NDMA nine o’clock daily meeting, Islamabad, August 23, 2010.


50. The definition used by the UK Stabilisation Unit: “Stabilisation is the process of establishing peace and security in countries affected by conflict and instability. It is the promotion of peaceful political settlement to produce a legitimate indigenous government, which can better serve its people. Stabilisation often requires external joint military and civilian support to perform some or all of the following tasks: prevent or reduce violence, protect people and key institutions, promote political processes and prepare for longer-term development,” http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/index.php/about-us/stabilisation-concept.


53. Jamaat-ud-Dawa is a prominent example of an Islamist organization thought to be a front for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).


64. Both Pakistani- and other government-lent assets.


68. OCHA, Inter-Cluster Diagnostic Mission to Pakistan, Islamabad and Peshawar, July 13-17, 2009.


70. When managing security, organizations can decide to label all their assets, vehicles, and staffs in order to be high profile and distinguish themselves from other actors, or they can decide to be as discreet as possible in order not to attract attention, adopting therefore a low profile strategy.
About the Author

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